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Abstract:  
Many recent papers dealing with the issue of knowledge spillovers have relied on patent data to 
extract information on so-called mobile inventors that is inventors designated by patent applications 
filed by different companies. In this paper we follow in this tradition, but with the aim of setting 
straight a number of methodological issues. By making use of information on the identity and 
history of those applicants, we then propose a taxonomy of the phenomena behind multi-applicant 
inventorship, which distinguishes between job mobility, mobility as a result of M&As, a case which 
we suspect to be dominated by the markets for research and for technologies, and residuals cases. 
We then argue that different multi-applicant inventors’ categories have to do with different patterns 
of knowledge diffusion, which include both spillovers and markets for technology. 
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Mobility of knowledge workers, such as R&D staff and other employees contributing to firms’ innovation 
effort, is often pinpointed as a major factor contributing to knowledge diffusion. Starting with Arrow’s 
(1962) classic reference, the issue of mobility has been most often linked to that of knowledge spillovers, 
that is of a particular kind of externality which is of direct relevance for a number of phenomena, such as the 
correct estimation of innovation production functions (Griliches, 2000), the existence of market failures 
(Geroski, 1995), and the agglomeration of industries and innovative activities (Feldman, 1999). Knowledge 
spillovers are often referred to as “pure externalities”, as opposed to “pecuniary externalities”, which also 
contribute to agglomeration, but have much less impact on economic theory and policy.  
In most cases, mobility is intended as job mobility, such as “when researchers leave a firm and take a job at 
another firm” (Jaffe, 1996). This kind of mobility generates a pure externality to the extent that the mobile 
researchers bring with themselves information, contacts and ideas they generated or acquired while working 
in the company they have left. However, this is not the only mobility mechanism that can generate 
knowledge diffusion.  
Employees of one company may end up working for another one as a consequence of mergers and 
acquisitions (M&A), in which case the absorbing company pays for the intellectual assets she acquires along 
with the absorbed company, including ideas embodied in individuals. In this case, “spillovers occur [only] 
when a researcher paid by one firm to generate new knowledge transfers to another firm […] without 
compensating his/her former employer for the full inventory of ideas that travels with him/her” (Geroski, 
1995). That is, in the absence of data on the economic details of the M&A operations, we cannot presume the 
existence, nor quantify the relevance of the externality. Nevertheless M&As are so frequent in high-tech 
industries that any attempt to evaluate the importance of pure spillovers should compare the relative 
importance of different mobility mechanisms  
It may also be the case that an inventor found to be responsible for, say, two patent applications held by as 
many different firms may in fact be working for a third one, whose business is performing contract research 
or consultancy; in which case we are at the opposite end of spillovers, and in the realm of markets for 
technologies (Arora et al., 2001). These can still generate externalities, but of a pecuniary kind. Recent work 
on academic inventors, that is university scientists responsible for patents owned by more than one business 
company, suggests that this may indeed be a relevant case (Balconi et al., 2003; Geuna and Nesta, 2003). 
Following Almeida and Kogut (1996), many papers have tried to measure the extent of mobility of 
knowledge workers by relying on patent data, from which information is extracted on what we will call 
“multi-applicant” inventors, i.e. inventors designated by patent applications filed by different companies. In most cases, multi-applicant inventorship has been taken as an indicator of job mobility. We argue that, in the 
absence of information on M&A activities and the nature of patent applicants, it is often hard to tell whether 
this is the case.  
In this paper we follow in the tradition of making use of patent data to track multi-applicant inventors, but 
with the aim of setting straight a number of methodological issues, and find out the relative weight of job 
mobility, M&A-induced mobility, and markets for technologies.  
We rely on the EP-CESPRI database on patenting activity at the European Patent Office (EPO), 1978-2003, 
from which we have extracted data on all the inventors with more than one patent applications signed in 
biotechnology-related fields, and a European address. We focus on all inventors with two or more patent 
applications, and no less than two different applicants.  
By making use of information on the identity and history of both the inventors and the applicants, we then 
propose a taxonomy of  phenomena behind multi-applicant inventorship, among which job mobility turns out  
not to stand as the dominant one.  
The paper is organized as follow. In section 2 we discuss the recent literature on inventors’ mobility and 
propose a taxonomy of multi-applicant inventorship. In section 3 present the data and the methodology for 
the construction of the data set. In Section 4 we present our results on the weight of the different typologies 
of multi applicant inventorship, in terms of number of inventors. In the same section , by using social 
network analysis technique, we show some of the characteristics of the network among applicants, generated 
by the flows of inventors . Section 5 provides conclusions and directions for future research. 
 
2. Multi-applicant inventorship: a review of patent-based studies and a 
taxonomy 
Within the broad field of the economics of innovation, most of the attention devoted to knowledge workers’ 
mobility has come from studies on geographical clusters and the spatial dimension of innovation diffusion.  
In a pioneering contribution, Jaffe, Trajtenberg and Henderson (1994; from now on JTH) shows that 
knowledge spillovers, which they measure with citation data, tend to be highly localized in space, even more 
than one could guess from merely looking at industrial agglomeration patterns. Many authors who have built 
upon JTH’s results have invoked both job mobility and social networks as explanations for JTH’s results (for 
a survey: Breschi and Lissoni, 2001). Only a few studies, however, have tried measuring inventors’ mobility 
in a straightforward way. 
Agrawal et al. (2003) explore the consequence for knowledge diffusion of inventors’ mobility in space. They 
find that mobile inventors’ patents tend to be cited by former research partners, which may be proof of the 
existence of social ties which both convey technological  knowledge and resist to locational change. 
  2These results are consistent with those achieved by Rosenkopf and Almeida (2003), who find that job 
mobility contributed, along with alliances, to knowledge diffusion in the US semiconductor industry.  
In the same vein Song, Almeida, and Wo (2001) focus on the patenting activities of engineers who moved 
from US to non-US firms, and investigate the extent to which mobility helps hiring firms to reach beyond 
their current technological and geographical boundaries. They find some evidence that learning-by-hiring is 
most useful when hired engineers are used for exploring new or distant knowledge rather than reinforcing 
existing expertise
1. 
Singh (2004) builds a social proximity graph of inventing teams for all US Patent Office patents from 1975-
1995
2. He finds out that knowledge flows are more likely to occur if mediated by social proximity among 
inventors’ teams, and that such social proximity explain geographic localization of knowledge spillovers. 
Teams are connected by inventors who move across teams. Similar methodology and results can be found in 
the work  by Breschi and Lissoni (2003), based upon European Patent Office data. 
None of these studies, however, investigates the different reasons why inventors move across firms or in 
space, and link up to new research teams. 
The only exception is Stolpe (2002), who analyzes the nature of R&D spillovers in the field of liquid crystal 
display technology: «research workers may move among different laboratories owned by one and same firm, 
or they may become an employee of a new firm when their old employer is the target of a take-over. In a 
similar vein , inventors may meet and collaborate in temporary research joint ventures» (Stolpe, 2002; pp. 
1187).  
However, Stolpe ends up encompassing all those forms of mobility in what he calls “changes of professional 
affiliation”. In particular, he identifies such changes by simply counting the number of inventors affiliations 
as emerged from the patent document. In a similar vein, Almeida and Kogut (1999) define moves [of 
inventors] as “the number of times that a major patent holder changes firms, as revealed in an analysis of all 
semiconductor patents”. 
Trajtenberg (2005) follows the same methodology. He analyses the patents of 1,565,780 inventors listed on 
U.S. patent documents. In what it promises to be the largest-scale attempt to measure inventors’ mobility, he  
equates each multi-applicant inventor to a mobile one and finds that 216,581 (about 33%) out of the total 
inventors have moved at least once.  
However, counting any inventor’s change of applicant as a “job move” across companies may be a highly 
misleading exercise.  
                                                 
1 This result is consistent with other works dealing with the linkage between technological benefit from alliances and 
mobility and technological distance between firms: going far beyond geographical boundaries could avoid technological 
path dependence and increase technological diversity. 
2 The graph is defined to have an edge between any two teams with common inventor. Teams with socially linked 
inventors have nodes belonging to the same connected component of this graph. The strength of their social link, or the 
social distance between the teams is given by the number of intermediate nodes on the minimum path between the two. 
  3Consider the case of  an inventor, whose name appears on 3 patents filed at times t-1, t, and t+1, respectively 
by companies A, B, and (again) A (figure 1). As we will show below, this is a frequent case: shall we 
interpret it as the result of two moves, one from A to B and one from B back to A? Or should we interpret it 
as the result of company A’s decision, at time t, to perform some occasional contract or co-operative research 
for/with company B, and trust it to the inventor of its past and future patents? 
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Information on all applicants served by one inventor may help solving these doubts. The case of an 
inventor’s name appearing on 3 patents filed by three different companies (say A, B, and C) is more likely to 
signal job mobility than the A-B-A (figure.2) 
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An implication of this line of reasoning is that inventors who are observed to serve only two applicants (say 
A and B) can be hardly defined as mobile: is A merely a research contractor of B, or a company the 
inventors has left to move to B (and then to C)? Conservative estimates of inventors’ mobility should 
consider only inventors with more than two patents, and at least three applicants. 
Information on the nature of the applicants (business company vs university, or public research organization) 
can also be necessary. Consider the example in the figure 3,  where an academic scientist works first in 
cooperation with company A (that takes a patent over the research results), than with company C (which also 
takes a patent), and in between on a federally funded project (whose results are patented by the scientist’s 
university, B). This is not a case of mobility, but one wherein a technology market transaction has occurred, 
between A and B, and then A and C. 
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This is not an unlikely case. Describing the mechanism of inventor relationship to the firm, Murray (2004)  
focuses on different typologies of academic inventor’s affiliations, saying that an inventor can quit the 
academia and move to the applicant firm, or enter the firm while retaining an academic affiliation, or keep a 
full-time academic position with no involvement with any firm. Actually the relationship between academia 
and firms makes the analysis of mobility through patent data very complicated. 
Patterns similar to those generated by academic inventors can also be observed when only firms are 
involved. Arora et al. (2001; pp.423-424) define markets for technologies as the “transactions for the use, the 
diffusion and the creation of technology. This includes transactions involving full technology packages 
(patents and other intellectual property and know-how) and patent licensing. It also includes transactions 
involving knowledge that is not patentable or not patented (e.g. software or the many non-patented designs 
and innovations)”. The rise of these markets marks the decline of the model of organizing innovation 
characterized by in-house R&D , where R&D and the complementary assets required for innovation were 
integrated inside the firms. Therefore trade in technologies has become very common and it is due, among 
others, to an increase in licensing revenues earned by firms and to an upsurge in patenting activities which 
reflect an increased opportunities for technologies licensing (Kortum and Lerner, 1999). 
Finally, information on property relationships between applicants may be also revealing. Consider the 
(frequent) case of an inventor whose patents appear first on A’s and then to B’s patents. If it turns out that in 
between the two patents’ application dates A has merged with or has been acquired by B (or B’s holding 
company), we can conclude that the inventor has not moved at all, nor she has generated any spillover. In 
fact, her intellectual assets has been bought along other assets of firm A. 
It could also happen that when observing a “move” from A to B, one can take a closer look and find out that 
B is an A’s spin-out, or that there is a Joint Venture in Research between A and B to develop one or more 
products of A’s or B’s pipelines. Only additional information about applicants can reveal in which case we 
stand. 
All these cases can be summarised in the “multi-applicant taxonomy”, which we present in table 1 and can 
be applied to all multi-applicant inventors with more than two patents and at least two applicants. 
Column TYPE of the table reports what we regard as the main types of multi-applicant inventorship, namely 
“job mobility”, “mergers and acquisitions (M&A)”, and “market for inventions”; “other” is a residual 
  5category for all patterns of multi-applicant inventorship that do not lend themselves to immediate 
interpretation. Therefore the last category encompasses any residual cases, i.e. cases one can classify only 
with information on patents and their applicants. To each typology of multi applicant inventors correspond 
one or more sub-categories (column CATEGORY) which refer to specific patterns of multi-applicant 
inventorship (that we report in the column PATTERNS).  
The last column (CASES) reports the most likely explanations for the observed patterns. To identify the 
distinct typologies of patterns of multi-applicant inventorship, we focus on the typologies of applicant, 
distinguishing them into three types: Open Science Organizations (OS), Private Technologies Organizations 
(PT) and Individuals (I).  We think of OS  as all the institutions which correspond to an Open Science 
Community setting, such as Universities, public research centre or public foundations. All firms belong to 
PT Organizations. We refer to Individuals patents as all the patents whose applicant is an individual. 
Table 1 – Multi-applicant inventorship: a taxonomy 
TYPE CATEGORY  PATTERNS  CASES 
1 A→B→C, No A→B→A 
Inventor moves form a firm to another 
one, then to a third one. No loop are 
observed  MOBILITY 
2 
A→B→C 
 where A and C are Organizations, B is an Individual*** (or vice versa)
One possible explanation regards the case 
of start-ups created by an inventor 
M&A 3  A→B→C, where A is merged with B  A merger or acquisition occurred between 
inventor’s applicant 
4 A→B→A, where A or B is a OS* Organization  At least one inventor's affiliation is an 
university or a public research centre  MARKET 
FOR 
INVENTIONS  5 A→B→A, where A and B are both PT* or Individual 
It might be the case that B performs 
contract research for, among others, A, as 
well as taking patents in its own name 
6 A→B→A and then  A→ C→ D (or vice versa) 
Patterns as a mix between mobility and 




7 A→B→B →B or  A→A→A →B 
It might be the case of an inventor who 
signed a first patent for an academic 
institution and then moving to a firm Also 
in this case further information is required 
*   OS=Open Science Organization: it includes universities and public research organizations 
**    PT= Private Technology Organization, i.e. business companies (incl. private laboratories) 
*** Individual = individual inventors (the inventor’s and the applicant’s name coincide) 
Therefore, combined with the identity of the applicant, the taxonomy described in table 1 allows us to 
identifies seven distinct typologies of patterns of multi-applicant inventorship: 
1.  A→B→C, where A,B, and C are all business companies (aka PT, Private Technology 
organizations): in this case we observe an inventor moving across three different applicants, i.e. she 
does not  “go back” a previous applicant. It is the most likely pattern to signal job mobility. 
2.  A→B→C, where A and C are Organizations, B is Individual (or viceversa): this pattern maintains 
the same characteristic of pattern nr.1, that is the inventor does not go back to the previous assignees. 
It might refer to cases of ventures started-up by inventors. 
  63.  A→B→C, where A (and/or C) is merged with B This is the category concerning all the case of 
mobility induced by phenomena of M&A processes. To reconstruct the stories of M&A processes of 
all firms one need to collect information about firms’ organizational events.  
4.  A→B→A, where A or B is a Open Science (OS) organization, such as a university or a public lab: 
this pattern recalls the activity of what have been called academic inventors. It is very likely that it 
does not deal with a real mobility of the individuals from an organization to another one. It rather 
reflects the phenomenon of market for inventions. 
5.  A→B→A, where A and B are both PTs or A is a PT and B is an Individual (or vice-versa): it is a 
likely case of B performing contract research and, occasionally, taking patents in its own name 
6.  A→B→A and then  A→ C→ D (or vice versa): this is a mixed pattern in which we observe in the 
first stage of inventors patenting activity a pattern which can excludes a case of mobility and in the 
second stage a pattern similar to pattern nr. 1. However, it is very challenging to assign such 
typology to a specific category of multi-applicant inventorship. At this stage of our research we 
consider this as a “residual” case. 
7.  A→B→B →B or  A→A→A →B : this category encompasses cases in which one observes an 
inventor signing a first patent for an applicant and the remaining part of her patenting activity for a 
distinct applicant. As we will see in the paragraph of the empirical results, this is a very critical case. 
In fact this represents a very common case in which we observe an inventor’s patenting activity 
characterised by a stable pattern of affiliation (the most part of patents are signed for the same 
assignee) and only one patent signed for a different assignee. At this stage of our research we 
consider this as a “residual” case. 
To summarise the taxonomy, categories 1 and 2  shape the typology of “job mobility”: we believe that it is 
very likely that an inventor following such pattern can be considered a true “mover”, that is an inventor who 
has effectively changed employers. 
The category 3 is what we call “M&A effect”: in this case a change of assignee code is observed but actually 
no real move of the inventor occurred. 
The categories 4 and 5 represent the realm of what we have called “market for inventions”. 




In order to test the usefulness of our taxonomy, we rely on the EP-CESPRI database on patenting activity at 
the European Patent Office (EPO). The database contains all the patent applications filed at EPO from 1978 
  7to 2003, complete with information on inventors. We have selected information on inventors who have 
signed more than one patent applications in biotechnology-related fields, from 1990 to 2003, and with 
addresses and applicants from either one of the seven European countries with the highest number of biotech 
patents, namely Denmark, France, Germany, Italy, Netherlands, Switzerland, and the United Kingdom.  
Biotechnology is a good field to test our taxonomy, since it is both patent-intensive and based upon a 
cumulative pattern of knowledge advancement: patent data, therefore, are a good indicator of both invention 
and innovation. It is also a field in which we may expect to find both mobile inventors, markets for 
technologies, and remarkable M&A activity. Following the OECD classification (Devlin 2003; van 
Beuzekom and Arundel, 2006), we define as biotech patents all those classified by EPO under the 
following 4-digit IPC (International Patent Classification) categories: 
C12M  Apparatus for enzimology or microbiology 
C12N  Micro-Organisms or enzymes. Compositions thereof. Propagating, preserving or maintaining micro-
organisms. Mutation or genetic engineering. Culture media 
C12P  Fermentation or enzyme-using processes to synthesise a desired chemical compound or composition or 
to separate optical isomers from a racemic mixture 
C12Q  Measuring or testing processes involving enzymes or micro-organisms. Compositions or test papers 
therefor. Processes of preparing such compositions. Condition-responsive control in microbiological or 
enzymological processes 
C12S  Processes using enzymes or micro-organisms to liberate, separate or purify a pre-existing compound or 
composition. Processes using enzymes or micro-organisms to treat textiles or to clean solid surface of 
materials 
Both inventors and companies in the EP-CESPRI database come with a unique code, which is the result of 
automated data cleaning procedures (which correct for misspelling or use of societal forms in the names) and 
data users’ feedbacks  (Tarasconi et al., 2006). These codes were further refined through manual checks of 
all records.  
Notice that, in order to keep the manual checking effort within manageable proportions, we did not examine 
inventors’ activity prior to 1990, nor their activity outside the selected IPC classes
3. This implies an 
underestimation not only of these individuals’ inventiveness, but possibly of multi-applicant inventorship. 
We do not believe this limitation may affect our results: considering the entire inventors’ patent portfolios 
would have possibly helped us tracking more cases of multi-applicant inventorship, but not necessarily more 
cases of one phenomenon as opposed to another (say, job mobility vs markets for technologies). 
  
                                                 
3 If we had considered all the patents (from all technological classes) signed by biotech inventors, from 1990 to 2003, 
we would have 18.413 patents, as opposed to 8.233 patents in our dataset. Furthermore, if we consider only the “mobile 
inventors”, the total patents, all technological classes, of such inventors, are 2.098, vs 1.507 patents referring to the 5 
technological classes we consider. It might mean that this specific category of inventors is more specialized in what we 
have defined as biotech, according to IPC we have taken into account. 
 
 
  8Table 2. Inventors in European biotech, after 1990; by nr. of patents 
Nr. of patents per inventor  Nr. of inventors  % 
just 1 patent  9123  68,87 
2 2137  16,13 
3 836  6,31 
4 402  3,03 
5 207  1,56 
6 or more  541  4,08 
Total  13246 100 
Source: Elaboration from EP-CESPRI data. 
The final dataset we ended up with contains 13.246 inventors, who have signed 8.233 patents, for a total of 
1.643 applicants (see table 2).  
The distributions of patents per inventor is highly skewed: almost 70 % of inventors (9.123 inventors) signed 
just one patent, and are of no interest for our analysis. Of the remaining 4.123 inventors, we are interested in 
those who have changed applicants at least once.  
These are 1508 individuals, that is more than one third (36,58 %) of all inventors with more than one patent 
(table 3). It may be worth noticing that this figure is very close to what found by Trajtenberg (2005) in an 
altogether different setting, namely USPTO patents in all technological classes, from 1975 to 1999. 
Table 3 – Inventors in European biotech, after 1990; by nr. of applicants 
Nr of applicants, per inv.  Nr of inventors  % 
1 2615  63,42 
2 1212  29,40 
3 203  4,92 
4 62  1,50 
5 22  0,53 
6 6  0,15 
7 2  0,05 
8 1  0,02 
Nr of multi-applicant inventors  1508  36,58 
Total 4123  100 
Source: Elaboration from EP-CESPRI data. 
We can  look also at the differences between mono- and multi-applicant inventors in terms of patent count 
(from now on we will consider only mono-applicant inventors with at least two patents). On average, multi-
applicant inventors sign more than 0.5 patents than mono-applicant ones (table 4). This confirms the 
importance of multi-applicant inventors, at least in terms of productivity. 
Table 4 – Summary patent statisics, per type of inventor  (European Biotech, after 1990) 
 mono  applicant  inventors  multi applicant inventors 
Mean nr. of patents  3,04  4,68 
Median nr. of patents  2,00  3,00 
Standard Deviations  2,56  4,58 
Source: Elaboration from EP-CESPRI data. 
In order to classify multi-applicant inventors according to the seven categories of the  taxonomy presented in 
section 2, we further focussed our analysis on those multi-applicant inventors with at least three patents over 
time, for a total of 945 individuals.  
  9In order to exploit also the seven category of the taxonomy we needed additional information on the M&A 
activities, and in general of the changes of property and/or name of all the patent applicants involved, that is 
for all firms  holding at least one patent signed by the 945 multi-applicant inventors with at least three 
patents. We retrieved manually this information from a variety of sources. 
We first visited retrieved company histories from all the websites of the patent applicants in our database, 
when available. In many cases we found detailed information on the chronological sequences of key M&As, 
plus all re-organizational processes into which the firm results to have been involved.  
Secondly, the same websites contains the firms’ annual reports which helped us to puzzle the missing 
information about events of dismissing or acquiring parts of firms’ assets. 
Finally, additional information by searching the web for papers and press releases on the companies touched 
upon multi-applicant inventorship.   
4. Results 
Table 5 presents the results of our taxonomic exercise, that is of the assignment of all multi-applicant 
inventors with at least three patents to one of the categories described in table 1. We first notice that the 
inventors who can be considered truly mobile, that is to have changed employer, represent less than one fifth 
of the total sample. 
Table 5 - Multi-applicant inventorship in European Biotech, after 1990
§
TYPE  CATEGORY  PATTERNS  # OF INVENTORS  % / TOT 
1 A→B→C, No A→B→A 174 
MOBILITY 
2 A→B→C, where A and C are Organizations, B is Individual (or vice versa) 12 
186  
(19,68 %) 
M&A 3  A→B→C, where A is merged with B  105  105 
 (11,11 %) 
4 A→B→A, where A or B is a OS* Organization  63  MARKET 
FOR 
INVENTIONS  5 A→B→A, where A and B are both PT** or Individual  183 
246 
 (26,03 %) 
7 A→B→A and then  A→ C→ D (or vice versa)  39 
OTHER 
8 A→B→B →B or  A→A→A →B 369 
408 
 (43,17 %) 
TOTAL     945  945  
(100 %) 
§ Only inventors with at least 3 patents  and two applicants are considered  
*   OS=Open Science Organization: it includes universities and public research organizations 
**    PT= Private Technology Organization, i.e. business companies (incl. private laboratories) 
*** Individual = individual inventors (the inventor’s and the applicant’s name coincide) 
Source: Elaboration from EP-CESPRI data. 
By using the information that we collected on firms’ M&A processes, we find out that a consistent number 
of inventors (around 11% ) seem to be interested by an M&A-induced mobility. 
The percentage of  inventors whose mobility is only apparent, and who are indeed more likely to have 
contributed to the market for technologies, is around 26 %. Within such category, the more consistent sub-
category is that concerning the multi-affiliation of inventors to the typology of applicant PT. It is likely that 
  10inventors belonging to such category are involved in a web of firm’s relationships as result from a variety of 
research and technologies transactions: licensing in and out, firms’ collaborations to jointly develop one or 
more products of firms’ pipelines, market for patents etc. 
Moreover, 63 cases of market for inventions involve one or more OS Organization, namely universities or 
public research centres. As already said, this reflects a partially different and, in a sense, complementary case 
of market for inventions, with respect to the previous one. It might refer to the cases of academic inventors 
who temporary collaborate with institutions (i.e. firms) for an R&D project, perhaps without missing the 
academic position. 
The residual category brings many inventors (408 inventors out of 945), which is too high a percentage for 
allowing us to consider our taxonomy entirely satisfactory. However, until a deeper scrutiny  will be done on 
what such category really refers to, it might be unfair to assign it to one of the specific category, whether 
movers or no movers, at least according to our restrictive criteria. 
What emerges from this exercise is that, as we expected, the core of  what can be defined as mobile inventors 
is very small, indeed it is the least populated set among the four we describe, in terms of number of 
inventors. If we calculate the weight of such category on the whole sample of inventors with at least 2 
patents, that is those who in theory might move, they do not represent a very common case (12,33%). It is 
enough to suspect that inventors’ mobility has so far been grossly over-estimated by the existing literature 
relying on patent data. 
In section 2 we suggested that different kind of multi-applicant inventorship provide different kinds of 
knowledge transfer. In a related paper, we explore this claim by looking at the citation rates and the identity 
of citing companies for patents coming from multi-applicant inventors. Here, we content ourselves to show 
how the way applicants are connected to each other by multi-applicant inventors change a lot, according to 
the type of phenomenon described in tables 4 and 5. 
In particular, we focus on two of the four categories of multi-applicant inventors’ taxonomy, namely 
“mobility” and “M&A”, whose resulting networks are described in figures 4 and 5, respectively. In both 
figures, nodes represent patent applicants, with a distinction between Private Technology organizations (that 
is, business companies: grey nodes) and Open Science Organization (black nodes)
4. Nodes’ size reflect the 
applicant’s number of bio-technology patents
5.  
The uni-directional arrows represent the ties between applicants, that is the flows of mobile inventors from 
one node (the organization who loses one or more inventor) to another (the organization that receives the 
inventors from the losing organization). The thickness of arrows reflect the number of inventors exchanged 
between nodes.  
The resulting networks are strikingly different.  
                                                 
4 The figure does not include the (few) cases of individual inventors moving to or from an organization. We also 
neglected nodes and ties involving Italian companies, which again are too few to change to overall network pattern. 
5 By “ bio-technology patents” we exclusively mean the patents we consider in our dataset. 
  11The network created by job mobility is wide (it involves 280 applicants, and 346 inventors’ moves), highly 
connected (all nodes belong to one giant component), with a very short average geodesic distance, very 
much along the lines of “small world” networks spotted in science by Newman (2001). Notice that although 
the network is more dense around the applicant-major patents holders, there is not a core of applicants which 
exchange the most of mobile inventors. As a consequence, we may expect knowledge exchanges induced by 
job mobility to be as sparse and wide-ranging as they are often depicted in the literature. 
 
We also notice that although most of inventors exchanges occur between PT Organizations (177 moves), the 
number of moves in which at least an OS Organization is involved is far from negligible (122 moves).  
Figure 4. Flows of Mobile Inventors 
      
 
The picture emerging from multi-applicant inventorship explained by M&As is much different (figure 5). 
First, although the number of inventors involved is less than half the number of inventors involved in job 
mobility  (186 vs 105 in figure 4), the applicants involved are much fewer (only 66 against 280). As a result, 
the network in figure 5 is made of a relatively few node that, with a few exceptions, exchange inventors with 
just another node. These exchanges are often more sizeable than those due to job mobility (compares the 
thickness of lines with that of figure 4). 
While inventors’ job mobility has the potential to give rise to a widespread knowledge diffusion mechanism, 
the same does not happen with M&As.  
As an example, let’s consider the thickest area in figure 5, which involves firms such as Aventis, Hoechst, 
and Behringwerke, among others. 
  12Many “moves” have been identified from and to Aventis (26 to and 11 from Aventis). The information on 
firms’ re-organizational process (mainly M&A processes) allows us to reconstruct the firms’ events. In fact, 
in 1996 Chiron Corporation acquired the 49% of Behringwerke A.G., a subsidiary of Hoechst: a new 
company was created Chiron Behring GmbH & Co. In 1998 Chiron Corporation acquired Sclavo. In 1998 
Chiron Corporation completed the acquisition of Behringwerke when it acquired the residual Hoechst AG’s 
interest in Chiron Behring Gmbh & Co.In 1999 Rhône-Poulenc S.A. merged with Hoechst Marion Roussel, 
which itself was formed from the merger of Hoechst AG with Roussel Uclaf and Marion Merrell Dow. The 
merger led to the creation of Aventis. This is just a part of the story explaining the exchange of inventors 
among such firms. 
Figure 5. Flows of Inventors - M&A 
         
If we consider another case, that of the firms Novo Nordisk and Novozymes, we find that a slightly different 
typology of re-organizational process occurred and that explain the “apparently” flows of inventors. In fact 
in 1989 Novo Nordisk was created through a merger between two Danish companies – Novo Industri A/S 
and Nordisk Gentofte A/S. In 2000 Novo Nordisk is split into three separate companies operating under the 
umbrella of the Novo Group: Novo Nordisk A/S, Novozymes A/S and Novo A/S. This would explain why 
we have identified 30 moves from Novo Nordisk to Novozymes. 
In both our examples, we have a large number of apparently mobile inventors, who indeed harldy moved and 
certainly did not contribute to diffuse their knowledge beyond the boundaries of the bilateral negotiations 
involving the firms which they worked for. Counting them along truly mobile inventors, such as those 
described by figure 4, may lead to grossly overestimated both mobility and the knowledge diffusion that goes 
with it. 
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5. Conclusions 
The aim of this paper was two-fold. The first aim was a methodological one: we meant to contribute 
methodologically to the empirical literature on inventors’ mobility. We have argued that not all the 
phenomena behind what we called “multi-applicant” inventorship may be equated to genuine, “job” 
mobility. By applying our taxonomy to EPO patent data in biotechnology, we have found that  both the 
existence of markets for inventions and M&A activity contribute to explain what the existing literature has 
hurried to put under one label only, that of mobility. We also found that mobility of inventors is far from 
being the dominant force behind multi-applicant inventorship. 
The second aim of the paper was to provide at least a hint of the reason why it is important to tell apart the 
various phenomena behind multi-applicant inventorship, namely that these phenomena bear different 
consequences in terms of knowledge diffusion. In this respect, we showed that the firms’ network generated 
by truly mobile inventors is very different from that created by M&A-induced multi-applicant inventorship. 
It is likely that such phenomenon signals the capacity of mobile inventors to connect more firms and 
institutions, than other categories of inventors, therefore providing a powerful mechanism of knowledge 
diffusion.   
In future research, we will further explore the impact of the different sources of multi-applicant inventorship 
by looking at the citation rates impact of both mono- and multi-applicant inventors, and of different 
categories of multi-applicant inventors.  
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